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differs from Section 52 in that, under the latter statute, the cause of
action arises in New York and the state has a valid objective in ex-
ercising its police power in protecting the life and limb of residents.
Here, objection may be raised on the ground that there is no reason
for the exercise of that inherent power. Further objection may be
made that the statute ". . . would involve us not only in problems of
constitutional power and complications of international usage, but in
a cumbrous and inconsistent and unworkable procedure which would
disorganize the scheme disclosed in other statutes, and there carefully
developed, for the administration of estates." 65
Whether the New York public policy which favors arbitration
agreements is strong enough to effectively eliminate state boundaries
in this area will, of course, eventually have to be determined by the
Supreme Court. It is not believed that a statute extending the juris-
diction of the state in this manner would be held to be constitutional.
However, the arbitration law will continue to be defective if an attempt
to correct it is not made; it will do no harm to try the remedy.
X
NOTIcE oF ATTORNEY'S LIEN-AcQuisITIoN OF LIEN PRIOR
TO COMMENCEMENT OF AN ACTION
Introduction
The common law afforded an attorney protection from the
"knavery" ' of his clients by securing payment for his services. This
was accomplished by two types of lien: one, the retaining lien on all
the client's papers in the attorney's possession, the other, the charging
lien on the judgment recovered through the attorney's efforts.2 These
liens were first created by the courts ".... in an effort to protect an
attorney from a client, who was willing to take the benefit of his
attorney's skill and labor, but who was unwilling to give anything
in return." 1
65 Cardozo, J., in Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N.Y. 363, 373, 128 N.E. 216, 219
(1920).
1 Goodrich v. McDonald, 112 N.Y. 157, 163, 19 N.E. 649, 651 (1889).
2 See Goodrich v. McDonald, supra note 1; Matter of Senitha, 252 App.
Div. 304, 299 N.Y. Supp. 407 (3d Dep't 1937), aff'd mere., 284 N.Y. 730, 31 N.E.
200 (1940) ; Ozorowski v. Pawloski, 207 Misc. 407, 139 N.Y.S.2d 31 (County
Ct. 1955). As far back as early Roman Law, an advocate had the right to
retain papers and instruments of his client until his fee was paid. See WEEKs,
A TaRATsE ON ArTORNEYS AND CouNsEuORs AT LAW 43 (2d ed. 1892).
3 Matter of Sebring, 238 App. Div. 281, 286, 264 N.Y. Supp. 379, 385 (4th
Dep't 1933).
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Retaining Lien
The retaining lien gives an attorney who has actual charge of
a case 4 the right to hold any papers,5 securities or money of his client
that have come into his possession in his professional capacity, until
all the compensation that may be owed to him is paid.6 This lien is
general, which means that the lawyer may exercise it to secure pay-
ment for professional services rendered, even though such services
are unrelated to any litigation, or to the particular papers or property
retained. 7 While the lien is akin to a mechanic's lien,8 it differs in
that it is purely passive, i.e., the attorney may not enforce it by fore-
closure and sale of the articles held; 9 he must hold the subject of the
lien until his fees are paid. Thus, the effectiveness of the lien is di-
rectly proportionate to the value placed upon the property by the
client.10 If the attorney withholds articles which his client may not
need or want, the lien is, for all practical purposes, worthless. On
the other hand, if the attorney retains something which is of great
value to his client, such as a deed, the lien becomes coercive and in-
duces payment. The effectiveness of the lien is increased by the fact
that a lawyer may deny permission to the client to inspect the articles
which are being held, despite the fact that such denial might impede
4 This is true even though he is not the attorney of record [Harding v.
Conlon, 146 App. Div. 842, 131 N.Y. Supp. 903 (1st Dep't 1911)], but not if
he is merely counsel. Matter of Kitzen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 738 (Sup. Ct. 1940);
see Schmidt v. Massapequa Co., 240 App. Div. 1011, 268 N.Y. Supp. 543 (2d
Dep't 1934).
5 Matter of Hollins, 197 N.Y. 361, 90 N.E. 997 (1910).
6 Matter of Heinsheimer, 214 N.Y. 361, 364, 108 N.E. 636, 637 (1915)
(dictum); Matter of Hollins, supra note 5 at 364, 90 N.E. at 998 (dictum).
Although the attorney may retain possession of papers left with him by his
client, his lien is not applicable to records and papers which by the rules of
the court must be filed in court, and which have been delivered to the attorney
for that purpose. Matter of Bergstrom & Co., 131 App. Div. 791, 116 N.Y.
Supp. 245 (1st Dep't 1909) (printed record of a case on appeal necessary in
order to make an appeal effective). Furthermore, where an attorney receives
possession of property for a specific purpose he must execute the directions
under which he received such property irrespective of any lien he might other-
wise have. Matter of Hollins, supra note 5 at 364, 90 N.E. at 998 (dictum).
7 Bowling Green Say. Bank v. Todd, 52 N.Y. 489, 491 (1873) (dictum);
see Matter of H- , an Attorney, 87 N.Y. 521 (1882) ; Matter of Sebring,
supra note 3.
8 See Matter of Heinsheimer, supra note 6.
9 In re Wilson, 12 Fed. 235, 238 (S.D. N.Y. 1882) (dictum); Goldman
v. Rafel Estates, Inc., 269 App. Div. 647, 649, 58 N.Y.S.2d 168, 171 (1st Dep't
1945) (dictum); Matter of Sebring, 238 App. Div. 281, 286, 264 N.Y. Supp.
379, 385 (4th Dep't 1933) (dictum). If the attorney has his client's funds
in his possession, he may satisfy his claim out of such funds, in certain in-
stances, upon application to the court to determine the attorney's fees. See
Matter of Welsh, 173 Misc. 22, 18 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Surr. Ct. 1939). But he
may not appropriate the funds before the amount due him is fixed by the court.
Bull v. Pendock Co., 239 App. Div. 590, 267 N.Y. Supp. 788 (4th Dep't 1933).
10 See Goldman v. Rafel Estates, Inc., supra note 9.
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the successful litigation of a pending suit.11 Since it is wholly de-
pendent upon possession, it follows that the lien is lost when the
attorney relinquishes possession of the property.12  However, if the
subject of the lien is wrongfully obtained from him, the lien is re-
tained, and the lawyer may replevy the property. 13
Statutory or Charging Lien
The common law also developed an entirely distinct and inde-
pendent lien called the charging or special lien.14 Its effect is to give
an attorney a guaranty of payment by binding the particular judgment
in regard to which he has rendered services. 15 This type of lien has
been virtually 'I superseded by statute.' 7 In the language of the pro-
visions of the New York Judiciary Law which prescribe it, the charg-
ing lien grants an attorney "who appears for a party" 1s its protection
by attaching ". . . to a verdict, . . . judgment or final order in his
client's favor, and the proceeds thereof in whatever hands they may
"Ibid. See Levine v. Levine, 206 Misc. 884, 135 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct.
1954). As was stated analogously in The Flush, 277 Fed. 25 (2d Cir. 1921),
"... a blacksmith has a lien on a horse for its shoeing, and can retain posses-
sion of the horse. If he were compelled to let the owner have the use of the
horse whenever he so desired, the blacksmith would simply be left with the
privileges of feeding and caring for the horse." Id. at 31.
12 See Goldman v. Rafel Estates, Inc., supra note 9; Matter of Senitha, 252
App. Div. 304, 299 N.Y. Supp. 407 (3d Dep't 1937), aff'd mne., 284 N.Y. 730,
31 N.E. 200 (1940). The attorney alone can assert a retaining lien, for it is
non-assignable. Sullivan v. City of New York, 68 Hun 544, 545 (N.Y. Gen.
T. Ist Dep't 1893) (dictum). "The relation between a client and his attorney
is one of trust and confidence, and it is a violation of that trust for an attorney
in any way to divulge any of the information given to him by his client, or
allow any of the papers or documents held by him as attorney to go out of
his possession. . . ." Id. at 546.
"3 Matter of Sebring, supra note 9 at 288, 264 N.Y. Supp. at 388 (dictum);
cf. Kline v. Green, 83 Hun 190, 191 (N.Y. Gen. T. 2d Dep't 1894) (dictum).
14 See Citizen's Bank v. Oglesby, 270 App. Div. 136, 58 N.Y.S.2d 591 (2d
Dep't 1945).
15 See Robinson v. Rogers, 237 N.Y. 467, 143 N.E. 647 (1924) ; Matter of
Senitha, supra note 12.
16 An action to establish an equitable lien under general equitable principles
is, at times, permitted where there would be no lien allowed under the statute,
e.g., in cases of trust funds recovered in an action, or a stockholder's derivative
action whereby the corporation receives the award. See 1 CARMODY-WAIT,
CYCLOPEDIA OF NENv YORK PRACTICE 354-55 (1952).
17 See Robinson v. Rogers, supra note 15; Matter of Senitha, 252 App. Div.
304, 299 N.Y. Supp. 407 (3d Dep't 1937), aff'd mere., 284 N.Y. 730, 31 N.E.2d
200 (1940) ; Matter of Sebring, 238 App. Div. 281, 264 N.Y. Supp. 379 (4th
Dep't 1933). The legislation regulating a charging lien is found in Sections
475 and 475-a of the New York judiciary Law.
18This means the attorney of record. Weinstein v. Seidmann, 173 App.
Div. 219, 159 N.Y. Supp. 371 (1st Dep't 1916). Its protection does not extend
to an attorney who acts as counsel. Matter of Sebring, supra note 17. The
new amendment, Section 475-a of the Judiciary Law, by its very nature, con-
tains no such qualification.
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come; and the lien cannot be affected by any settlement between the
parties before or after judgment . ,, 19 Thus the lien may be ac-
tively enforced against any recovery received by the client, whether
in settlement or in payment of the judgment, for the amount due the
attorney.20
When there is a settlement effected between the parties the lien
will attach to the fund the instant it is created by the settlement, and
the lawyer may follow the proceeds into the hands of his client.21
Furthermore, if a settlement is made without notice to the attorney,
and the client is financially irresponsible, 22 or goes beyond the juris-
diction of the court after obtaining the funds, the attorney may look
to the defendant for payment.23  Good faith on the part of the de-
fendant is irrelevant, 24 since ". . . the law conclusively assumes [the
defendant] . . . has retained [an amount] sufficient to pay the sum
which the [attorney] . . . was entitled to receive." 25 Basing the
assumption in logic, it is reasoned that because the lien attaches to
the sum agreed upon in settlement the instant the agreement is made,
and because the defendant has both actual and constructive notice 26
of the lien, he is liable.2 7  It is prudent, therefore, for the defendant
to retain a sufficient sum to provide for the lien of the plaintiff's
attorney. If the amount to be retained is unknown to the defendant,
he is under an obligation to ascertain it.28  Since the judiciary Law
19 N.Y. JU'DICIARY LAw § 475. "The first sentence of [Section 475-a] ...
is patterned after the language of Section 475, except that [it] . . . omits the
word 'judgment' appearing in the provision of Section 475 that the lien
attaches to 'a verdict, report, determination, decision, judgment or final order.'
The sentence also provides, as does Section 475, that the lien cannot be affected
by any settlement between the parties after notice of the lien is given."- But
"[tihe apparently inadvertent omission of the word 'judgment' creates a surface
inconsistency with Section 475, but . . . judgments would appear to be com-
prehended in the other terms used." N.Y.C. BAR Assoc., LEGis. BULL. No. 1,
13-14 (1955).
20 An attorney for a defendant may have a statutory lien only where the
answer contains a counterclaim. Ekelman v. Marano, 251 N.Y. 173, 167 N.E.
211 (1929) ; National Exhibition Co. v. Crane, 167 N.Y. 505, 508, 60 N.E. 768,
769 (1901) (dictum).
21 Fischer-Hansen v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 173 N.Y. 492, 500, 66 N.E.
395, 397 (1903) (dictum). "The lien was not affected by the adjustment, but
leaped from the extinguished cause of action to the amount agreed upon in
settlement." Id. at 502, 66 N.E. at 398.
22 Ozorowski v. Pawloski, 207 Misc. 407, 139 N.Y.S.2d 31 (County Ct. 1955).
23 Fischer-Hansen v. Brooklyn Heights R., supra note 21.
24 Ibid.
25 Sargent v. McLeod, 209 N.Y. 360, 365, 103 N.E. 164, 166 (1913).
26 "This is a statutory lien of which all the world must take notice, and any
one settling with a plaintiff without the knowledge of his attorney, does so at
his own risk." Peri v. New York Cent. R-R., 152 N.Y. 521, 527, 46 N.E. 849,
850 (1897).
27 See Fischer-Hansen v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 173 N.Y. 492, 66 N.E. 395(1903); Morgan v. Drewry, 285 App. Div. 1, 135 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dep't
1954).
28 Fischer-Hansen v. Brooklyn Heights R, supra note 27 at 501, 66 N.E.
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provides that the charging lien attaches to the proceeds of a deter-
mination "in whatever hands they may come," the attorney may also
follow the recovery into the hands of third parties.29
Unlike the retaining lien which may be used to collect a general
balance due,30 the statutory charging lien may be enforced only for
services and "disbursements" in the particular action or proceeding in
which the recovery is made.31 However, the charging lien is
not confined to an attachment of the recovery from the particular pro-
ceeding for which the attorney is retained, but attaches to the client's
cause of action and to any recovery thereon, even though it was ob-
tained in a different proceeding.3 2
Inasmuch as the lien is satisfied out of the judgment, it is ap-
parent that the lien will not attach if the judgment awarded is not,
of itself, the proper subject of a lien. Thus, where an injunction is
granted, there are no proceeds or funds to which an attorney's lien
might attach and, therefore, the protection conferred by the Judiciary
Law is denied.3 3  On the other hand, any property right which the
judgment may protect, secure, or enforce, is properly denominated
the proceeds of a judgment and is, therefore, subject to attachment.3 4
Thus, where the ownership of property is in issue and it is adjudged
to belong to the attorney's client, the attorney may impress a lien on
that particular property.35 This rule is limited, however, and the lien
will not attach if the judgment recovered for the client is for his ex-
clusive benefit and ".... is of such a nature that permitting a lien to
attach to it would be inimical to the purpose for which it was
awarded." 36 This rule would apply, for example, to alimony for the
support of the client.37
at 398 (dictum); Ozorowski v. Pawloski, 207 Misc. 407, 409, 139 N.Y.S.2d
31, 33 (County Ct. 1955) (dictum).
29 Peri v. New York Cent. R.RL, supra note 26 at 528, 46 N.E. at 850 (1897)
(dictum).
30 See note 6 supra.
31 Matter of Heinsheimer, 214 N.Y. 361, 108 N.E. 636 (1915); Irish Free
State v. Guaranty Safe Deposit Co., 148 Misc. 256, 266 N.Y. Supp. 8 (Sup.
Ct. 1933), aff'd mtem., 242 App. Div. 612 (1st Dep't 1934).
32 Morgan v. Drewry, 285 App. Div. 1, 135 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dep't 1954);
Matter of Lourie, 254 App. Div. 555, 3 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1st Dep't 1938).3 3 Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 170 Misc. 855, 11 N.Y.S.2d 286
(Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd mem., 261 App. Div. 822, 25 N.Y.S.2d 784 (2d Dep't
1941); Irish Free State v. Guaranty Safe Deposit Co., sara note 31 at 258,
266 N.Y. Supp. at 10.
34 See 1 CARMODY-WAIr, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK PRACTICE 364 (1952).
35 See West v. Bacon, 13 App. Div. 371, 43 N.Y. Supp. 206 (1st Dep't 1897),
modified, 164 N.Y. 425, 58 N.E. 522 (1900). However, in the case where an
attorney successfully defends an action to divest his client of title to property,
the attgrney has no charging lien on the property where his client's answer
did not contain a counterclaim. Ekelman v. Marano, 251 N.Y. 173, 167 N.E.
211 (1929). See note 20 supra.
30 1 CARMODY-WAIT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEv YORK PRACtiCE 367 (1952). See
Branth v. Branth, 57 Hun 592, 10 N.Y. Supp. 638 (Gen. T. 1st Dep't 1890).3 Branth v. Branth, supra note 36; see Levine v. Levine, 206 Misc. 884, 135
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Lien Upon Substitution or Discharge
An attorney may be discharged or withdraw at any stage of a
proceeding, even if under a definite contract.38 The client is at lib-
erty to terminate the lawyer-client relationship with or without
cause.39 However, he cannot defeat the lawyer's right to be compen-
sated for services already rendered.40 The client will be obligated to
the attorney for the reasonable value of the services up to the time of
discharge.41 Where the services were rendered in connection with a
recovery which the client ultimately obtained, the court will protect
the attorney by impressing a lien for that amount upon the fund so
recovered. 42
The question arises, under what circumstances will an attorney
be denied his retaining lien or his charging lien? If he is discharged
without cause, 43 or voluntarily withdraws from a case with just
cause,44 both his charging and his retaining liens remain. Aside from
fault, there may be other occasions when the court will deprive a
lawyer of his retaining lien. If the action has reached the trial stage
and the client wishes to substitute attorneys, he must make an appli-
cation to the court to obtain a new attorney of record.45  The court
in granting the order to substitute attorneys may, where the interests
of justice necessitate it,46 compel an attorney to give up papers upon
N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 1954). "The purpose of alimony is support. Equity,
which creates the fund, will not suffer its purpose to be nullified .... In such
circumstances, equity, confining the fund to the purposes of its creation, de-
clines to charge it with liens which would absorb and consume it. . . ." Turner
v. Woolworth, 221 N.Y. 425, 429-30, 117 N.E. 814, 816 (1917).
38 See Matter of Dunn, 205 N.Y. 398, 98 N.E. 914 (1912).
39 Matter of Lydig, 262 N.Y. 408, 187 N.E. 298 (1933) (per curiam) ; see
Robinson v. Rogers, 237 N.Y. 467, 143 N.E. 647 (1924) ; WHITNEY, CONTRAcTS
284 (5th ed. 1953).
40 Robinson v. Rogers, supra note 39; Matter of Board of Water Supply,
179 App. Div. 877, 167 N.Y. Supp. 531 (3d Dep't 1917). See Matter of Senitha,
252 App. Div. 304, 299 N.Y. Supp. 407 (3d Dep't 1937), aff'd inern., 284 N.Y.
730, 31 N.E.2d 200 (1940).
41 Matter of Senitha, supra note 40; Levine v. Levine, supra note 37. If
the attorney fully performs his contract prior to discharge, he may stand upon
that and recover the contracted value of his services. McAvoy v. Schramme,
238 App. Div. 225, 264 N.Y. Supp. 181 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 263 N.Y. 548,
189 N.E. 691 (1933).
42 Matter of Board of Water Supply, supra note 40.
43 Robinson v. Rogers, .ntpra note 39; Matarrese v. Wilson, 202 Misc. 994,
118 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
4 See Goldman v. Rafel Estates, Inc., 269 App. Div. 647, 58 N.Y.S.2d 168(1st Dep't 1945); Dunn v. New York, 269 App. Div. 1002, 58 N.Y.S.2d 534 (3d
Dep't 1945).
45 See PRASHKER, NEW YORK PRAcricE 208 (3d ed. 1954).
46 See Hauptmann v. Fawcett, 243 App. Div. 613, 276 N.Y. Supp. 523,
modified nem., 243 App. Div. 616, 277 N.Y. Supp. 631 (2d Dep't 1935);
Doubleday & Co. v. Garden Spot Apartments, Inc., 68 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup.
Ct. 1947) (both were cases in which the client had immediate need for papers).
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which he claims a retaining lien, if the client furnishes security.47
This right is founded upon the power which the courts have over
attorneys as officers of the court to compel them to act equitably and
in a fair manner with their clients, and is not an attempt to destroy
the lien upon the giving of security.48
New Legislation
Since the benefits afforded by Section 475 of the Judiciary Law
arise only after the institution of suit,49 an attorney who felt that his
client might retain another attorney served a summons as soon as
possible in order to establish his lien.50 Thus, many suits which were
eventually settled before trial were instituted merely to satisfy the
provisions of Section 475.51 In referring to the large number of per-
sonal injury claims which were first brought to the attention of cas-
ualty insurance companies by the service of a summons and com-
plaint, the Temporary Commission on the Courts reported that,
"[c] onvincing evidence has been furnished that a substantial number
of these claims could have been adjusted without suit if the claimant's
attorney and the insurance company representative had carried on
negotiations." 52 The necessity for attorneys to comply with the pro-
visions of Section 475, in order to establish their lien, was advanced
as one of the principal causes of such needless suits.53
It is obvious that the above practice burdened an already con-
gested court calendar in New York. Accordingly, Section 475 was
supplemented by the addition of Section 475-a of the Judiciary Law.5 4
4 7 Doubleday & Co. v. Garden Spot Apartments, Inc., supra note 46; Robin-
son v. Rogers, 237 N.Y. 467, 474, 143 N.E. 647, 649 (1924) (dictum).4 8 Robinson v. Rogers, supra note 47 at 472, 143 N.E. at 649 (dictum) ; see
Matter of Makames, 238 App. Div. 534, 265 N.Y. Supp. 515 (4th Dep't 1933).49 N.Y. JuDicrARy LAW § 475.50 See REPORT OF Tpm, owARY COMM'N ON THE COURTS, LEO. Doc. No. 45
at 29 (1955).
5 See Prashker, 1955 Civil Practice Changes, 27 N.Y. STATE BAR BuLL.
159, 164 (1955).
52 See note 50 supra at 28.
53 Id. at 29.
54 "If prior to the commencement of an action, special or other proceeding,
an attorney serves a notice of lien upon the person or persons against whom
his client has or may have a claim or cause of action, the attorney has a lien
upon the claim or cause of action from the time such notice is given, which
attaches to a verdict, report, determination, decision or final order in his client's
favor of any court or of any state, municipal or federal department, except a
department of labor, and to any money or property which may be recovered on
account of such claim or cause of action in whatever hands they may come;
and the lien cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties after such
notice of lien is given. The notice shall, (1) be served by either personal ser-
vice or registered mail; (2) be in writing; (3) state that the relationship of
attorney and client has been established, the nature of the claim or cause of
action, and that the attorney claims a lien on such claim or cause of action;
1955 ]
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The new section, while granting a timelier lien, has the same effect
and is enforceable in the same manner as a lien obtained under Sec-
tion 475.55 Now, a lien may be acquired prior to the commencement
of an "action, special or other proceeding," if the attorney serves a
notice of lien upon the person or persons against whom his client
may have a claim or cause of action. The lien attaches at the time
such notice is given. However, it is to be cautioned that the new
section requires that the notice be in writing, state that the relation-
ship of attorney and client has beefn established, and be served either
personally or by registered mail. In addition, the notice must be
signed by both the attorney and the client, or by a person in his behalf
whose relationship is shown, which signature shall also be witnessed
by a disinterested person whose address is given.
The advantages of this section are obvious. By safeguarding
the interests of the attorney at an earlier stage of the dispute, it
enables claims to be disposed of prior to the institution of suit. In
the words of its proponents, it is designed ".. . to encourage attorneys
to enter into discussions of claims with the prospective defendant, his
attorney or insurance carrier before rather than after the commence-
ment of suit, thus facilitating adjustments at an early stage and easing
calendar congestion by forestalling the initiation of litigation." 5
Conclusion
The extent of the practice of instituting suit merely to establish
a lien is, of necessity, conjectural. Enactment of the new section,
however, is a laudable step toward relief from the calendar congestion
in New York State. This statute is not novel, similar statutes having
been enacted in Illinois 57 in 1909, and in Rhode Island 5 in 1923.
The beneficial results which have been achieved under these statutes
indicate that Section 475-a should effectively remedy the situation
which prompted its enactment.
(4) be signed by the client, or by a person on his behalf whose relationship
is shown, and which signature shall also be witnessed by a disinterested person
whose address shall also be given; and (5) be signed by the attorney. A lien
obtained under this section shall otherwise have the same effect and be enforced
in the same manner as a lien obtained under section four hundred seventy-five
of this chapter. Added L.1955, c. 551, eff. April 21, 1955." N.Y. JUDICIARY
LAW § 475-a.
55 See note 54 supra.
56 N.Y.C. BAR Assoc., LaGis. BULL. No. 1, 14 (1955).
57 ILL. RaV. STAT. c. 13, § 14 (1951).
58 R.I. Grax. LAWS c. 450, § 1 (1938).
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